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Abstract 
Renewable energy sources (RES) play an increasing role in many electricity systems thanks to climate 
and support policies and subsequent cost reductions in recent years. Compared to conventional 
generation technologies, RES has two main important distinctive features: First, their cost pattern is 
characterized by high investment and negligible variable costs and second, their operational decision is 
governed by weather conditions limiting their availability. In this paper, we aim to analyze the role of 
RES in electricity markets focusing on the interplay of investment and dispatch decisions under different 
levels of market competitiveness and different support schemes; namely, feed-in tariff, feed-in 
premium, and investment subsidies. To this end, we develop a two-stage model of endogenous 
investment and operation with both intermittent and conventional technologies to obtain analytical 
solutions for investment and operation decisions. We show that there are feedback effects between the 
investments of different firms, and between the different technologies of the same firm. Exercise of 
market power results in underinvestment in the conventional technology; but the effect on renewables 
is ambiguous due to the interplay of opposing investment incentives. The results furthermore highlight 
that for the optimal design of a support policy the underlying competiveness of the market needs to be 
considered. 
Keywords: renewable energy, electricity market, investment, renewable support, market power, two-
stage game 
JEL Classification: L94, C72, C73, L13, Q42 
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1. Introduction 
Electricity markets are in transition from predominantly fossil-based and centralized structures towards 
low-carbon and renewable generation. This transition will require significant investments in generation 
and transmission infrastructure in the coming decades (e.g. the 2017 World Energy Outlook assumes 
investment needs of ca. 19 trillion US$ until 2040, IEA. (2017)). Given the lumpiness, long construction 
times, and lifetimes of conventional power plants, uncertainty about future developments has always 
been a central part of electricity system assessments. In the regulated systems of the last century, this 
uncertainty could be buffered via adjustments of end-user tariffs. However, in a liberalized framework 
the investors have to bear a larger share of this risk and account for the uncertainty in its investment 
decision.  
This development is further influenced by the increasing role of intermittent renewable energy 
sources in many electricity systems. When it comes to investment decision making, many renewables 
show distinct features compared to conventional power plants. They have a cost pattern characterized 
by high investment costs and very low marginal operation costs and their availability to operate in a 
given moment depends on the weather conditions. Furthermore, many electricity regulators support 
renewable deployment via various mechanisms. Given this setting, investors face a challenge to decide 
about which technology choices to make and account for the impact of uncertainty of renewables in 
production as well as the investment decision made by competitors. 
In this paper, we take up this challenge and develop an equilibrium model of endogenous operation 
and investment decisions accounting for the intermittency of renewables, competition between firms 
and different renewable support schemes. The model is designed as a two-stage process with firms 
making investment decisions in the first stage and operational decisions in the second stage. We 
account for two types of firms, namely an exclusively renewable investor and a mixed renewable-
conventional investor (called the generalist), and assess perfectly competitive markets as well as 
imperfectly competitive ones (in form of Cournot competition). Given the multitude of support schemes 
for renewables in many current electricity markets, we account for feed-in tariff, feed-in premium, and 
investment subsidies for renewables. 
The model will be a first step in conceptualizing the incentive structures in electricity markets with 
high shares of renewable energies. We will apply the model to disentangle the impact of the different 
elements (intermittency, support schemes, and competitiveness) on the resulting investment and 
operation patterns and identify interactions that need to be accounted when designing renewable 
support. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. In section 3, 
the general model structure and assumptions are presented. In sections 4 and 5, we calculate 
equilibrium investments for the perfectly competitive and imperfectly competitive markets. Section 6 
provides a comparison of the respective findings and a numerical representation. Section 7 briefly 
discusses limitations of the study. Finally, section 8 summarizes and concludes. 
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2. Literature Review 
The analysis of investment and operational decisions is a cornerstone of economics with a subsequent 
extensive body of theoretic and applied literature. Our approach relates to four main fields within this 
literature. We first focus on the role of investments in reconstructed electricity markets and the role and 
difference of perfect and imperfect competition. Second, the developed model is formulated as a two-
stage game with an investment and operational stage based on existing sequential investment modeling 
approaches. Third, as we extend this model by accounting for the intermittent nature of renewables, the 
paper is also linked to the literature on investment in renewable energy sources. Finally, as the model 
also addresses the impact of different support schemes on investment decision, we also relate to the 
literature on support policy evaluations. In the following, we will provide a short review of these four 
fields.  
The electricity market has been traditionally regarded as a natural monopoly and hence highly 
regulated (Tamás et al. (2010)). Therefore, modeling the expansion of generating infrastructure has 
been traditionally approached by solving an operation and investment cost minimization problem 
carried out by a single monopolist, e.g. central planner or a regulator. However, the liberalization and 
reconstruction of the electricity sector into a competitive market framework caused changes in the 
structure of the power industry (e.g. new investors entering the market) and in the participants’ 
investment and operation policies. Therefore, modeling approaches should be adjusted accordingly. 
Depending on the level of competition, either classical optimization approaches representing a perfectly 
competitive setting or game theoretic approaches representing imperfect competition can be used. The 
latter is especially relevant since, despite implementation of policies to promote competition, there is 
still evidence of market power in the electricity markets (Helgesen and Tomasgard (2018)). Moreover, 
even years after the first restructuring efforts, the majority of electricity markets are still highly or fairly 
concentrated due to technological and financial barriers to entry (Van Nuffel et al. (2016)). Crampes and 
Creti (2005) show that in oligopolistic electricity markets, firms may enforce market power by 
withdrawing generation in the short-term or restricting investment in capacity in the long-term. Several 
empirical studies also support this idea (e.g. Wolak and Patrick (2001)). Market power issues might also 
continue to exist in the future since the prospective forced capacity phase-outs (e.g. nuclear or coal) 
would reduce available capacity in the market which potentially decreases competition. However, 
recent discussions regarding the reform in European renewable support policies mostly fail to consider 
certain risks of market power in electricity markets (Dressler (2016)). 
Since game theoretical approaches are able to model the strategic behavior of the involved parties, 
they are useful in modeling electricity markets. However, only a limited number of game theoretical 
models of imperfect competition have looked at the investment problem. The main reason is that 
equilibrium models lack robustness when applied to capacity expansion problems (F. Oliveira (2008)). 
The literature model the game using different approaches such as Stackelberg-based game (as in 
Ventosa et al. (2002)) and Cournot-based approach (as in Murphy and Smeers (2005)). Given the 
increased dynamics on liberalized electricity markets, the literature also explores multiple further topics 
related to investment/operation decisions and competitiveness. For instance, Garcia and Shen (2010) 
analyze the equilibrium level of investments when firms exercise market power in the short-run. Boom 
and Buehler (2007) discuss the impact of electricity market reconstruction on capacity investments 
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under different market configurations. The literature also addresses the impact of price caps (Tishler et 
al. (2008)) and forward markets (Grimm and Zoettl (2006), and  Murphy and Smeers (2010)) on firms’ 
behavior in imperfectly competitive markets. 
Given that electricity markets are characterized by irreversible capacity investment costs, several 
studies use a sequential structure to model investment and operation stages in electricity markets. In a 
two-stage approach, firms first commit to investing a certain capacity; then, in the next stage, they 
participate in a spot market, considering the installed capacity as the upper limit of their generation. 
Given that electricity markets are abundant with sources of uncertainty, a majority of the studies in this 
literature adopt a stochastic programming approach (e.g. Gabszewicz and Poddar (1997), Murphy and 
Smeers (2005), Liu et al. (2016), Pineda et al. (2018) and Weidmann et al. (2018)). 
The emergence of renewable energy sources has influenced the dynamics of liberalized electricity 
markets and resulted in a large body of literature addressing the interplay of renewables and electricity 
markets. Many renewable energy sources (e.g., wind and photovoltaics) are of an intermittent nature, 
i.e. unlike conventional technologies, their production potential varies over time and thereby affects the 
outcome of the electricity markets, including capacity investment decisions (T. Oliveira (2015)). The 
consequences of intermittency will be accentuated as the share of renewables in the market increases.  
The literature on modeling effects of intermittency of renewables on investment decisions is expanding. 
However, most papers are either country-specific numerical simulations (e.g., Green and Vasilakos 
(2010), and Milstein and Tishler (2011)) and/or empirical studies (e.g., Liski and Vehviläinen (2016)). In 
contrast, there are few theoretical assessments. For instance, Ambec and Crampes (2012) analyze the 
optimal and market-based provision of electricity with intermittent sources of energy. Helm and Mier 
(2016) show that intermittency of renewables causes an S-shaped diffusion pattern. Chao (2011) 
develops efficient pricing and investment rules in a competitive market with intermittent resources. 
Other related theoretical contributions are Twomey and Neuhoff (2010) as well as Rouillon (2015). They 
consider the capacity of either the intermittent technology or the reliable technology as given.  
In addition to their market feedback, renewable energy sources are usually supported by various 
schemes and thereby link the liberalization of electricity markets with the broader topic on energy and 
environmental policy. Consequently, there are many studies that analyze and/or compare effects of 
support schemes. The literature is dominated by qualitative and country-specific empirical studies (e.g. 
Mitchell et al. (2006), Haas et al. (2004), Butler and Neuhoff (2008), Lipp (2007) Klessmann et al. (2008) 
Haas et al. (2011)) and detailed numerical based approaches (e.g. Rubin and Babcock (2013) Boomsma 
et al. (2012) Winkler et al. (2016) Fagiani et al. (2013)). Analytical approaches are attracting more 
attention in recent years. Some of the studies also consider intermittency of renewable sources. Liu et 
al. (2016)) compare capacity choices of firms under different feed-in-tariff-based support schemes. To 
model intermittency of renewables, they consider an average model approach, i.e. instead of different 
states of availability, they use a single state in which only an average amount of the renewable capacity 
is available. Ambec and Crampes (2015) build on their earlier paper with an analytical assessment of 
carbon taxes, feed-in tariffs, and renewable portfolios. They consider a single stage framework. In 
addition, they model price-taking firms and enforce zero-profits conditions for the firms. Garcia et al. 
(2012) introduce feed-in tariffs and renewable portfolios in a stylized model of electricity production 
with an intermittent source of energy. They assume price-taking firms and force zero expected surpluses 
for the producers. In addition, they consider an inelastic demand and an exogenous price cap. 
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Our paper emerges from the interfaces of the aforementioned literature. One of our main 
contributions is to study investments and operation in markets with intermittent sources while allowing 
firms to act strategically under different support schemes. Our approach is based on the two-stage 
literature and includes the specific features of electricity markets and renewables based on the 
respective literature streams while the support policies directly relate to the renewable policy literature. 
Our paper, therefore, can be seen as a new combination of existing approaches. We combine those 
different dimensions in one analytical setting and analyze effects of market power on outcomes of 
renewable support schemes. Our approach is close to the model design of Weidmann et al. (2018). 
However, the focus of our analysis is on the impact of different renewable support schemes whereas 
Weidmann et al. (2018) focus on the interplay between consumer tariffs and wholesale competition. 
 
3. Model Structure 
In this section, we present the general structure of the underlying model including the two-stage setting, 
the renewable intermittency representation, players and their decision variables, as well as basic 
assumptions and simplifications.  
3.1 General Model Design 
 
Figure 1: Schematic presentation of the two-stage model structure 
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We consider an electricity market with two types of technologies, i.e. conventional and renewable, 
and two types of firms, i.e. generalist and exclusively renewable, that make investment and operation 
decisions in two separate stages (Figure 1). While the conventional technology is dispatchable, the 
renewable source is non-dispatchable and intermittent. While the generalist firm, denoted by G, invests 
in both conventional and renewable plants, the exclusively renewable firm, denoted by E, invests in only 
renewable energy sources1. In the investment stage, the firms simultaneously decide on their capacity 
investments. Afterwards, in the operation stage, the firms participate in a uniform spot market for 𝑇 
periods. Since E owns only the non-dispatchable technology, it has no direct choices to make in the 
operational stage. On the other hand, G has dispatchable conventional technology; therefore, the 
conventional output 𝑄𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣 is the only decision made in the operational stage. Firms' objective functions 
are to maximize their aggregate profits.  
The investment cost and operation costs of the conventional technology are both linear, where 
𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑣 and 𝑐𝑚𝑟𝑔 are per unit costs of investment and operation, respectively. On the other hand, the 
investment cost of the renewable technology is convex, which stems from the fact that potential sites 
for renewable investments vary in quality; therefore, later investments in renewables are costlier since 
more favorable sites are already occupied. For the sake of simplicity, we assume quadratic investment 
cost functions 
1
2
𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝐾𝐺
res  2 and 
1
2
𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝐾𝐸
res  2 for firm G and E, respectively. We assume the renewable 
investment cost coefficient 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠 is identical for both firms so that the differences between renewable 
investments of the firms are due to their incentive structure rather than technological advantages of 
one firm over the other. The operation cost of the renewable technology is zero. For simplicity, we 
assume only one conventional and one renewable technology. It would be straightforward to extend the 
model to a setup with more players or more technologies. 
We model intermittency of the renewable source in the operation stage by using a binary 
approach, similar to Ambec and Crampes (2012). We assume two states of availability for renewables: 
the available state, denoted by A, and the unavailable state, denoted by U. State A, is realized in 𝑞 
percent of the periods (𝑞𝑇 periods). On the other hand, state U, occurs in (1 − 𝑞)𝑇 periods. The value of 
𝑞 is known to all firms in the investment stage. In the operation stage, firms know the state of nature of 
the period for which they are bidding. Consequently, the conventional output decision 𝑄𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣 may differ 
for the two states. 
The demand side is represented via a linear inverse demand function 𝑃 = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑄𝑡𝑜𝑡, where 𝑄𝑡𝑜𝑡 
is the aggregate generation and 𝑎 and 𝑏 are functional parameters. The inverse demand function is 
constant in all periods of the operation stage and independent of the renewable availability.  
The two stages influence one another; installed capacity in the investment stage is the upper bound 
for the production in the operation stage. On the other hand, the expected profitability of the operation 
stage influences investments decisions of the firms in the investment stage.  
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Assuming the existence of the exclusively renewable firm is in line with the fact that in many markets there are 
firms owning only renewables as investing in renewables faces fewer barriers to entry (T. Oliveira (2015)).  
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3.2 Mathematical Model Formulation 
In this section, we formulate the general mathematical optimization problems of the firms in different 
stages and states for the benchmark case of no support scheme.  
The exclusively renewable firm E faces the following profit maximization problem: 
max
KE
res
 qTπE
A − 
1
2
cresKE
res  2 (1) 
where, 𝜋𝐸
𝐴 is the profit of firm E in state A of the operation stage. 𝜋𝐸
𝐴 depends on the firm's own capacity 
as well as G's behavior. By assumption, the profit in state U, 𝜋𝐸
𝑈, is zero as the renewable source is 
unavailable. The profit is defined by the resulting equilibrium spot market price 𝑃𝐴∗ and the output in 
the state A which, due to non-dispatchability, is equal to the installed capacity: 
πE
A = PA∗KE
res (2) 
On the other hand, the generalist firm, G, faces the following optimization problem in the 
investment stage: 
max
KG
cnv,KG
res
 qTπ
G
A + (1 − q)TπG
U − ccnvKG
cnv  −
1
2
cresKG
res  2 (3) 
where 𝜋𝐺
𝐴 and 𝜋𝐺
𝑈 are the spot market profits of G in state A and U, respectively. Due to non- 
dispatchability of the renewable technology, only the conventional production can be controlled in the 
operation stage, which may vary depending on the realized state. In state U, only the conventional 
capacity of G is present in the market: 
πG
U = max
0≤QG
cnv,U
≤KG
cnv
[PU∗QG
cnv,U − cmrgQG
cnv,U] (4) 
In state A, on the other hand, firm G's spot market problem is as follows: 
πG
A = max
0≤QG
cnv,A
≤KG
cnv
[PA∗(Q
G
cnv,A + KG
res) − cmrgQG
cnv,A ] (5) 
Consequently, the choice variables of G are its renewable capacity, (𝐾𝐺
𝑟𝑒𝑠), its conventional capacity 
(𝐾𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣), and its conventional output in state A (𝑄𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣,𝐴) and state U (𝑄𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣,𝑈). 
Equilibrium prices on the spot market are defined by the linear demand function and the type of 
competition. In general, the spot price in state A is defined by the output of conventional and renewable 
production: 
PA = 𝑎 − b(QG
cnv,A + KG
res + KE
res) (6) 
Whereas prices in state U are only defined by the conventional production: 
PU = 𝑎 − 𝑏(𝑄𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣,𝑈) (7) 
We solve the two-stage model using backward induction. First, we calculate the reaction functions 
of the firms in the operation stage for given installed capacities. Then, the reaction functions will be 
substituted in the first stage to obtain installed capacities.  
To simplify the presentation, we limit the following analysis to the case where the equilibrium 
satisfies: 
0 < QG
cnv,A∗ (8) 
QG
cnv,A∗ < QG
cnv,U∗ (9) 
These assumptions collectively mean that, in equilibrium, the conventional technology is active in all 
states. Assumption (8) means that, in state A, the conventional technology is not fully crowded out by 
the renewable technology. On the other hand, assumption (9) suggests that renewable generations, at 
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least marginally, reduce conventional generations in state A. Assumption (9) follows the logic that as the 
zero marginal cost renewables enter the market in state A, there is less room for the conventional 
technology generation compared to state U in which the conventional technology has the whole market 
to profit from2. Assumption (9) also implies that while the conventional technology will be bounded by 
the capacity limit in state U (Lemma 1), its optimal generation will be less than its capacity in state A 
(Lemma 2).  
Lemma 1: 
In state U, optimal conventional generation of firm G is equal to its capacity (𝑄𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣,𝑈∗ = 𝐾𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣∗). 
Proof: Assume 𝑄𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣,𝑈∗ = 𝐾𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣∗ does not hold true. Given the capacity constraint 
𝑄𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣,𝑈 ≤ 𝐾𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣, the only possible case left is 𝑄𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣,𝑈∗ < 𝐾𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣∗. Considering with assumption (9), we have 
𝑄𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣,𝐴 ∗ < 𝑄𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣,𝑈 ∗ < 𝐾𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣∗. This means that the conventional production of firm G never hits its upper 
capacity limit. Given that capacity investment is costly, it is in contradiction to the profit maximization 
logic of the firm G to invest in a costly capacity that is never used. Therefore, this contradiction shows 
that 𝑄𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣,𝑈∗ = 𝐾𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣∗. ▄ 
Lemma 2: 
In state A, optimal conventional generation of firm G is not limited by its capacity (𝑄𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣,𝐴∗ < 𝐾𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣 ∗). 
Proof: 𝑄𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣,𝐴∗ < 𝑄𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣,𝑈∗ and 𝑄𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣,𝑈∗ = 𝐾𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣∗ gives 𝑄𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣,𝐴∗ < 𝐾𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣 ∗. ▄ 
We use these lemmas in all market designs to derive unique solutions for investment and operation 
stages3. 
 
4. Perfect Competitive Market Setting 
In this section, we analyze the equilibrium market behavior in a perfectly competitive market. After 
describing the benchmark case of no support policy, we analyze effects of introducing investment 
subsidies, feed-in premium, and a feed-in tariff policy. 
4.1 No Renewable Support  
The basic model as described in Section 3.2 represents a pure spot market framework without any 
renewable support. Assuming that the two firms act as price takers on the spot markets, we can derive 
the following investment behavior. 
 
                                                          
2 However, if investment cost of the conventional technology is relatively too high, it might be optimal for the 
generalist firm to invest so few in conventional technology that the conventional production hits its upper capacity 
limit in both states and consequently 𝑄𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣,𝐴∗ = 𝑄𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣,𝑈∗ = 𝐾𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣∗. We omit this case for the analysis at hand. 
3 Without these assumptions, we might either end up with markets with no capacity investment or face profit 
functions with multiple equilibria or multiple local optima.  
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Proposition 1:  
In the case of no support scheme and perfect competition, equilibrium investment capacities are given 
by: 
KG
cnv ∗ =
1
b
(𝑎 − cmrg −
ccnv
(1 − q)T
) 
KG
res ∗ =
cmrg
cres/qT
 
KE
res ∗ =
cmrg
cres/qT
 
Proof: Given that 𝑄𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣,𝑈 ∗ = 𝐾𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣 ∗(Lemma 1), the optimization problem of firm G in state U can be 
rewritten as: 
πG
U = PUKG
cnv − cmrgKG
cnv (10) 
In state A, firm G’s profit is additionally influenced by its renewable output: 
πG
A = max
QG
cnv,A
PA(QG
cnv,A + KG
res) − cmrgQG
cnv,A (11) 
As 𝐾𝐺
𝑟𝑒𝑠 is given in the operational stage and by Lemma 2 the conventional output is not at its capacity 
limit, the resulting market price is 𝑃𝐴∗ = 𝑐𝑚𝑟𝑔 and the resulting profit function can be simplified to: 
πG
A = cmrgKG
res  (12) 
Similarly, the profit for firm E in state A is then given by: 
πE
A = cmrgKE
res  (13) 
Using equations (10), (12), and (13) in the investment stage yields the following optimization 
problems for the firms:  
max
KE
res
 qTcmrgKE
res −  
1
2
cresKE
res  2 
(14) 
max
KG
cnv,KG
res
 qTcmrgKG
res + (1 − q)T(PUKG
cnv − cmrgKG
cnv) − ccnvKG
cnv  −
1
2
cresKG
res  2 
(15) 
The first order conditions with respect to 𝐾𝐸
𝑟𝑒𝑠 and 𝐾𝐺
𝑟𝑒𝑠 directly lead to the results stated in Proposition 
1. The first order condition with respect to 𝐾𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣 is given by: 
(1 − q)T (
𝜕𝑃𝑈
𝜕KG
cnv . KG
cnv + PU − cmrg) − ccnv  = 0 (16) 
By assumption, the firms are treated as price takers and we have  
𝜕𝑃𝑈
𝜕𝐾𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣 = 0. Therefore, equation (16) 
can be written as:  
(1 − q)T (𝑎 − bKG
cnv − cmrg) − ccnv  = 0 
(17) 
leading to the respective equilibrium condition for KG
cnv stated in Proposition 1. ▄ 
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The results of Proposition 1 are rather intuitive. Investments into renewable capacities are solely 
driven by the market price in state A, as this is the only state in which renewables can obtain a profit to 
cover their investment costs. As renewables are only available in 𝑞 percent of the total periods, the 
respective investment costs need to be adjusted accordingly. Reformulating the equilibrium investment 
capacity results in a cost-price equality: 
cresKG
res ∗ = cresKE
res ∗ = qTPA∗ 
In other words, the marginal renewable investment costs (𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝐾𝐺
𝑟𝑒𝑠 ∗ and 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝐾𝐸
𝑟𝑒𝑠 ∗) are equal to the 
marginal market income. A feedback between conventional and renewable units occurs only via the 
resulting market price in state A. The price is defined by the marginal unit within the market; which is 
assumed to be conventional. Higher variable costs of conventional technologies would thereby lead to a 
higher renewable investment. The availability of renewables has a direct effect on equilibrium 
investments as renewables with a low availability required higher market prices to compensate the 
reduced income. 
The availability also plays a role on the feedback effect of renewables on conventional investments. 
Adding one unit 𝐾𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣 gains marginal revenue only in state U since it is the only state in which 
conventional production is limited by 𝐾𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣. In state A the conventional generator only recovers its 
marginal generation costs which does not provide investment incentives. As the price setting in state U 
is independent of renewable production, only the occurrence probability is important for the 
investment incentives. The market price in state U is given by 𝑃𝑈∗ = 𝑐𝑚𝑟𝑔 +
𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑣
(1−𝑞)𝑇
. Thus, an increase in 
the availability of renewables would lead to higher equilibrium market prices in the state in which they 
are unavailable so that conventional technology may refinance their investments. Note that average 
market price is simply equal to long-term marginal costs of the conventional technology: 
Pavg =
(1−𝑞)𝑇PU+𝑞𝑇𝑃𝐴
𝑇
=
(1−𝑞)𝑇[𝑐𝑚𝑟𝑔+ 𝑐
𝑐𝑛𝑣
(1−q)T
]+𝑞𝑇[𝑐𝑚𝑟𝑔]
𝑇
= 𝑐𝑚𝑟𝑔 +
𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑣
𝑇
. 
The conventional investment logic also allows deriving the general impact of intermittent 
renewables on this market setting. Consider a framework with only conventional technologies, that is, 𝑞 
would become 0. This would result in the market price equalizing the long-term marginal costs of the 
conventional technology (𝑃𝑁𝑜𝑅𝑒𝑠 = 𝑐𝑚𝑟𝑔 +
𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑣
𝑇
). In other words, the market price would equal average 
production costs. Including renewables does not change this logic but affects the price structure. As 
conventional units still need to recover their average production costs, the market price in periods 
without renewable injection (state U) needs to jump high enough to compensate the price drop in 
periods with renewable injection (state A) (𝑃𝑈 > 𝑃𝑁𝑜𝑅𝑒𝑠 = 𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑔 > 𝑃𝐴). This essentially means that on 
the quantity side, introduction of renewables to the market decreases conventional production in 
periods without renewable injection and increases total production in periods with renewable injections 
(𝑄𝑈∗ < 𝑄𝑁𝑜𝑅𝑒𝑠 < 𝑄𝐴∗). 
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4.2 Renewable Support Schemes 
In the following, we extend the basic model to include different price-based renewables support 
schemes, namely investment subsidies, feed-in-premium (FIP), and feed-in-tariff schemes (FIT). In all 
cases, we assume the support scheme is financed from the general government budget (rather from the 
taxes levied on the consumer’s electricity bill) and therefore ignore feedback effects stemming from 
changed end-consumer demand due to refinancing aspects.4 
4.2.1 Investment Subsidies 
First, we investigate investment-stage subsidies in which the regulator pays the investors a constant 
subsidy 𝑖 per unit of renewable capacity investment in the investment stage. Therefore, the optimization 
problems of E and G in the investment stage are: 
max
KE
res
 qTπE
A −  
1
2
cresKE
res  2 + iKE
res 
(18) 
max
KG
cnv,KG
res
 qTπG
A + (1 − q)TπG
U − ccnvKG
cnv  −
1
2
cresKG
res  2 + iKG
res 
(19) 
Compared to the no support case (equations (1) and (3)), terms 𝑖𝐾𝐸
𝑟𝑒𝑠 and 𝑖𝐾𝐺
𝑟𝑒𝑠 are added to the 
objective functions. The optimization problems of the operation are identical to the no support case. 
Proposition 2:  
In the case of an investment subsidy scheme and perfect competition, equilibrium investment capacities 
are given by: 
KG
cnv ∗ =
1
b
(𝑎 − cmrg −
ccnv
(1 − q)T
) 
KG
res ∗ =
cmrg + i/qT
cres/qT
 
KE
res ∗ =
cmrg + i/qT
cres/qT
 
Proof: Given that the operation stage of this investment subsidy scheme is the same as for the basic 
case, the resulting total investment objectives are as follows: 
max
KE
res
 qTcmrgKE
res −  
1
2
cresKE
res  2 + 𝑖𝐾𝐸
𝑟𝑒𝑠 
(20) 
max
KG
cnv,KG
res
 qTcmrgKG
res + (1 − q)T(PUKG
cnv − cmrgKG
cnv) − ccnvKG
cnv  −
1
2
cresKG
res  2 + 𝑖𝐾𝐺
𝑟𝑒𝑠  
(21) 
Consequently, the incentives for investment in conventional capacities are unaltered whereas the first 
order conditions with respect to 𝐾𝐸
𝑟𝑒𝑠 and 𝐾𝐺
𝑟𝑒𝑠 directly lead to the results stated in Proposition 2. ▄ 
                                                          
4 For the same reason we exclude quantity-based support mechanisms like a green quota with tradeable 
certificates, as this would introduce a second price element for consumers and thereby bias the envisioned 
comparison. 
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The resulting investment behavior is straightforward: the investment values for renewables are 
adjusted by the (normalized) subsidy rates (𝑖/𝑞𝑇) as it provides additional marginal income for 
investments in renewable technology for both firms, which leads to a higher installed renewable 
capacity. The conventional investment is not influenced as, by assumption, their investment incentives 
stem from the periods without renewable production. As the increase in renewable capacities due to 
the investment subsidy has no impact on their availability, there is not feedback of the subsidy on the 
investment decisions of G regarding the conventional technology.  
4.2.2 Feed-in Premium 
A feed-in premium is a subsidy on the output instead of the capacity. The regulator pays the generator a 
constant additional payment 𝑝 on top of the market price per unit of renewable energy generation. The 
operational profit optimizations of the two firms in state A are accordingly: 
πG
A = max
0≤QG
cnv,A≤KG
cnv
PA(QG
cnv,A + KG
res) − cmrgQG
cnv,A + pKG
res (22) 
πE
A = (PA∗ + p)KE
res (23) 
As renewables are not available in state U, the corresponding profit optimization for firm G (giving 
𝜋𝐺
𝑈) is not altered. 
Proposition 3:  
In the case of a feed-in premium support scheme and perfect competition, equilibrium investment 
capacities are given by: 
 KG
cnv ∗ =
1
b
(𝑎 − cmrg −
ccnv
(1 − q)T
) 
KG
res ∗ =
cmrg + p
cres/qT
 
KE
res ∗ =
cmrg + p
cres/qT
 
Proof: Given assumption (8) the conventional technology is still active in state A and therefore is setting 
the price (i.e. 𝑃𝐴∗ = 𝑐𝑚𝑟𝑔). Therefore, the respective profit equations (22) and (23) can be simplified to: 
πG
A = (cmrg + p )KG
res (24) 
πE
A = (cmrg + p )KE
res (25) 
which leads to the adjusted investment stage profits of: 
max
KE
res
 qT(cmrg + p )KE
res − 
1
2
cresKE
res  2 
(26) 
max
KG
cnv,KG
res
 qT(cmrg + p )KG
res + (1 − q)T(PUKG
cnv − cmrgKG
cnv) − ccnvKG
cnv  −
1
2
cresKG
res  2 
(27) 
The first order conditions with respect to 𝐾𝐸
𝑟𝑒𝑠, 𝐾𝐺
𝑟𝑒𝑠, and 𝐾𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣 directly lead to the results stated in 
Proposition 3. ▄ 
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The resulting investment behavior shows many similarities to the investment subsidies. Feed-in 
premium increases the equilibrium renewable investments while it does not impact investments in 
conventional technology. Even though the feed-in premium and investment subsidies target different 
stages (operation and investment, respectively), their equilibrium investments are structurally similar to 
each other. This is mainly because the two schemes keep the remaining features of the systems identical 
to each other; in particular, both policies require renewables to participate in the market.  
4.2.3 Feed-in Tariff 
Contrary to the feed-in premium or investment subsidies, a feed-in tariff entitles renewable energies to 
receive a direct payment without participating in the market. The regulator pays the investors a 
constant payment 𝑓 per unit of renewable production, regardless of the market price. However, the 
renewable production is still accounted for in the spot market as it reduces the residual demand 
conventional units face. For the renewable firm E, the profit optimization in the operational stages is: 
πE
A = fKE
res  (28) 
For the generalist, the profit in state U is again not impacted and the profit in state A is split into the 
market revenue for the conventional technology and the feed-in tariff for the renewable technology: 
πG
A = max
QG
cnv,A
PAQG
cnv,A − cmrgQG
cnv,A + fKG
res (29) 
Proposition 4:  
In the case of a feed-in tariff support scheme and perfect competition, equilibrium investment capacities 
are given by: 
KG
cnv ∗ =
1
b
(𝑎 − cmrg −
ccnv
(1 − q)T
) 
KG
res ∗ =
f
cres/qT
 
KE
res ∗ =
f
cres/qT
 
Proof: Similar to the case of feed-in premium, the conventional technology is defining the price level in 
state A (i.e. 𝑃𝐴∗ = 𝑐𝑚𝑟𝑔) simplifying the spot market optimization for firm G to: 
πG
A = fKG
res  (30) 
which leads to the adjusted investment stage profits: 
max
KE
res
  qTfKE
res −  
1
2
cresKE
res  2 
(31) 
max
KG
cnv,KG
res
 qTfKG
res + (1 − q)T(PUKG
cnv − cmrgKG
cnv) − ccnvKG
cnv  −
1
2
cresKG
res  2 
(32) 
The first order conditions with respect to 𝐾𝐸
𝑟𝑒𝑠, 𝐾𝐺
𝑟𝑒𝑠 and 𝐾𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣 directly lead to the results stated in 
Proposition 4. ▄ 
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The resulting investment is again straightforward: Conventional investments are not impacted by 
the feed-in tariff as their refinancing is based on the revenues in state U. Renewable investments are 
completely driven by the feed-in tariff and do not depend on market dynamics or other technologies.  
 
4.3 Comparative Conclusion 
Table 1 presents an overview of equilibrium capacity investments under different policies in 
perfectly competitive markets. In all settings, the equilibrium investment of the generalist firm in the 
conventional technology is the same. In other words, the renewable support schemes do not affect the 
equilibrium investment of conventional capacity. This result may seem as a contradiction to the ongoing 
debate on revenue impacts of renewable support on incumbents. One the one hand, this finding can be 
attributed to the chosen model structure and simplifying assumptions made. Given the setting with an 
externally defined binary renewable availability structure, only one conventional technology, and the 
assumption that its output is not at the capacity limit in the state with renewable injection, all 
investment incentives are limited to the period without renewable injection and thereby not impacted 
by renewable policies.  
On the other hand, the driving economic concept behind this result is the equation between 
marginal costs of investments and market prices. This basic relation is indeed independent of the chosen 
model characteristic. Even with more technologies or a more complex renewable availability pattern, 
the finding would remain the same: investment incentives are only defined in those periods in which the 
technology is at its capacity limit. If a technology is not at its limit, it is, by definition, setting the market 
price (or completely out of the market) which is similar to our state A. If a unit is at its limit, the market 
price sets direct investment incentives as in our state U; even if another unit/technology sets the market 
price in this period. The relevant relation between renewable support and conventional investments is 
the frequency of those different states. As, by assumption, the frequency of those periods is not 
impacted by the amount of renewable capacity installed in our model formulation, we do not observe a 
direct feedback effect. However, in reality, with a multitude of different local renewable injection 
patterns, an increase in installed capacities is likely to also change the frequency of the two market 
states for a technology. Consequently, there will be a feedback effect as indicated by the (1 − 𝑞)𝑇 in the 
equilibrium capacity if 𝑞 becomes a function of renewable capacity installed. 
 
 
Table 1 Equilibrium investments under perfect competition 
 No support Investment subsidies Feed-in premium Feed-in tariff 
KG
cnv ∗ 
1
b
(𝑎 − cmrg −
ccnv
(1 − q)T
) 
KG
res ∗ 
cmrg
cres/qT
 
cmrg + i/qT
cres/qT
 
cmrg + p
cres/qT
 
f
cres/qT
 
KE
res ∗ 
cmrg
cres/qT
 
cmrg + i/qT
cres/qT
 
cmrg + p
cres/qT
 
f
cres/qT
 
 
Page | 15  
Furthermore, we need to distinguish between conventional capacity and conventional generation. 
Most of the ongoing debate on incumbent revenues is focused on the pay-off streams for past 
investments whereas our model is focused on greenfield investments. Renewable generation pushes 
conventional generation out of the market (i.e. in state A the conventional output 𝑄𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣,𝐴 is reduced by 
the output of renewable units 𝐾𝐺
𝑟𝑒𝑠 + 𝐾𝐸
𝑟𝑒𝑠). In our model this has no impact on payoff streams as the 
conventional technology remains the price setter and exactly covers its generation costs regardless of 
the actual amount of energy produced in state A. In reality, this ‘merit order effect’ of renewables can 
lead to an alteration for the inframarginal units on their income stream as it reduces the price levels in 
those periods when they earn capacity rents (Cludius et al. (2014)). This reflects the challenge of 
uncertain market developments as most exiting power plants were committed with a different pay-off 
structure in mind (i.e. less renewables) and now cannot recover their full costs due to the alteration of 
price structures in the market. Without any further market interventions, those units receiving too little 
income would leave the market and the resulting market equilibrium would again be defined by the 
basic relation as presented in Table 1. 
Turning to the renewable capacities, the results show that the investment incentives are 
independent of the firm’s structure. Both firms, E and G, show the same equilibrium investments. Given 
the market structure, firm G has no advantage or disadvantage compared to firm E due to ownership of 
conventional units. Comparing the effect of the different support schemes on renewable incentives, the 
investment subsidies and feed-in premium show a nearly identical structure. The only difference is how 
to account for the frequency of the periods. If both subsidies are supposed to have the same effect, we 
need to set 𝑖 = 𝑞𝑇𝑝. In other words, when comparing capacity and energy subsidies the capacity factor 
is crucial, otherwise their impact is identical. Feed-in tariffs, on the other hand, have the distinguishing 
feature that they are independent of the market price. Thus, if one aims to equalize their effect with a 
capacity or output subsidy, the market price needs to be accounted for; i.e. 𝑓 = 𝑃𝐴∗ + 𝑖/𝑞𝑇 = 𝑃𝐴∗ + p 
which can pose challenges if further market dynamics like variable fuel and emission prices need to be 
accounted. 
 
 
5. Imperfect competitive market setting 
In this section, we investigate the impact of renewable support schemes on investment incentives under 
imperfect competitive market conditions, i.e. when players exercise market power by withholding 
investment in the investment stage or generation in the operation stage. Similar to the previous section, 
we analyze a benchmark case of no support scheme in details and afterwards we extend the results to 
the markets with different support schemes. 
The optimization problems of the players in imperfect markets are the same as those of the 
perfect markets. The main difference between imperfect and perfect markets is that players consider 
their influence on market price. As a result, throughout this section, we skip representing the 
optimization problems of the firms in the investment and operation stage, as they are identical to their 
counterparts in section 4.  
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5.1 No Renewable Support 
First, we analyze a pure spot market framework without any renewable support. Assuming that the two 
firms can influence the spot prices by their output and capacity decisions, we can derive the following 
investment behavior. 
Proposition 5: 
In the case of no support scheme and imperfect competition, the equilibrium investment capacities are 
given by: 
KG
cnv ∗ =
1
2b
(𝑎 − cmrg −
ccnv
(1 − q)T
) 
KG
res ∗ =
cmrg
cres/qT
 
KE
res ∗ =
𝑎 + cmrg
2
cres
qT + b
 
Proof: Given that we know 𝑄𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣,𝑈 ∗ = 𝐾𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣 ∗ (Lemma 1), the optimization problem of firm G in state U 
can be rewritten as: 
πG
U = PUKG
cnv − cmrgKG
cnv (33) 
Given that 𝑃𝑈 = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝐾𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣, we have:  
πG
U = (𝑎 − cmrg)KG
cnv − bKG
cnv 2 (34) 
Assuming an interior solution (based on assumption (8) and Lemma 2), the optimization problem of G in 
state A is: 
πG
A = max
QG
cnv,A
PA(QG
cnv,A + KG
res) − cmrgQG
cnv,A (35) 
Given that 𝑃𝐴 = 𝑎 − 𝑏(𝑄𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣,𝐴 + 𝐾𝐺
𝑟𝑒𝑠 + 𝐾𝐸
𝑟𝑒𝑠), the first order condition with respect to 𝑄𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣,𝐴 yields: 
QG
cnv,A ∗ =
𝑎 − cmrg
2b
−
KE
res
2
− KG
res (36) 
with the resulting price in state A given by: 
PA ∗ =
𝑎 + cmrg
2
−
bKE
res
2
 (37) 
Equation (36) and (37) allow us to state the optimization problem of G as: 
πG
A = (
𝑎 + c
2
−
bKE
res
2
− cmrg) (
𝑎 − cmrg
b
−
KE
res
2
) + cmrgKG
res (38) 
Similarly, the profit of firm E in state A is given by: 
πE
A =
𝑎 + c
2
KE
res −
b
2
KE
res 2 (39) 
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Using (34), (38) and (39) in (1) and (3), we have the following terms for the optimization problems of the 
firms in the investment stage: 
max
KE
res
 qT (
𝑎 + c
2
KE
res −
b
2
KE
res 2) −  
1
2
cresKE
res  2 
(40) 
max
KG
cnv,KG
res
 qT ((
𝑎 + c
2
−
bKE
res
2
− cmrg) (
𝑎 − cmrg
b
−
KE
res
2
) + cmrgKG
res)
+ (1 − q)T((𝑎 − cmrg)KG
cnv − bKG
cnv 2) − ccnvKG
cnv  −
1
2
cresKG
res  2 
(41) 
First order conditions with respect to 𝐾𝐸
𝑟𝑒𝑠, 𝐾𝐺
𝑟𝑒𝑠, and 𝐾𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣 directly lead to the results stated in 
Proposition 5. ▄ 
Renewable investments of the firms (𝐾𝐺
𝑟𝑒𝑠 ∗ and 𝐾𝐸
𝑟𝑒𝑠 ∗) are different from each other. However, 
both KG
res ∗ and KE
res ∗ increase with lower normalized renewable investment costs, 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠/𝑞𝑇, and higher 
marginal generation cost of the substitute conventional technology, 𝑐𝑚𝑟𝑔. 
For the generalist firm the optimal choice of 𝐾𝐺
𝑟𝑒𝑠, 𝑄𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣,𝐴 and 𝐾𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣 combines several interaction 
effects. Its investment in conventional capacity will only impact state U in which the firm acts as a 
monopoly. Consequently, the resulting choice of 𝐾𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣 ∗ follows the monopoly pricing rule while 
accounting for the frequency of state U in the investment cost share. If renewables are available for 
longer periods (having smaller (1 − 𝑞)𝑇), investments in conventional technology will be reduced since 
they make less total marginal profit to justify more investments. 
Given 𝐾𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣 ∗, the choice for 𝐾𝐺
𝑟𝑒𝑠 and 𝑄𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣,𝐴 depend only on state A and given that 𝑄𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣,𝐴 is 
strictly smaller than 𝐾𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣 ∗ due to assumption (9), its choice does not influence marginal revenue of 
𝐾𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣. In state A conventional and renewable production have the same effects on G’s income (since 
they both obtain the same spot price 𝑃𝐴). However, their cost effects differ. Whereas the conventional 
generation has variable costs and its capacity already refinanced via state U, the renewable generation 
has no variable costs, but its capacities need to be refinanced via the income in state A. As is evident 
from equation (35), 𝑄𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣,𝐴 and 𝐾𝐺
𝑟𝑒𝑠 are in a direct relation, i.e. an additional unit of output from 
renewable capacities of G reduces the conventional output by the same amount. This in turn means that 
the income renewables generate in state A is the saved costs of generating via the conventional 
generation as the price itself is not impacted by this switch (equation (37)). Consequently, the 
equilibrium investment for 𝐾𝐺
𝑟𝑒𝑠 is defined by its internal substitution potential (𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝐾𝐺
𝑟𝑒𝑠 = 𝑞𝑇𝑐𝑚𝑟𝑔) 
rather than the market price. This finding is in line with the analysis of von der Fehr and Ropenus (2017) 
for a feed-in premium market, which argues that a generalist firm should equate the marginal costs of 
conventional and renewable sources. On the other hand, the exclusively renewable firm E faces a 
different investment incentive structure compared to a generalist firm. Firm E considers market price 
(not the marginal cost of the conventional technology) and effects of its investments on the market 
price of state A given by 𝑃𝐴 =
𝑎+𝑐𝑚𝑟𝑔
2
− 𝑏
𝐾𝐸
𝑟𝑒𝑠
2
 (equation (37)). A higher 
𝑎+𝑐𝑚𝑟𝑔
2
 (higher base price) and 
lower b (less sensitive price) incentivize E to invest more in renewables.5 
                                                          
5 The structure of 𝐾𝐸
𝑟𝑒𝑠 ∗is the consequence of having a linear as well as a quadratic cost function; equilibrium 
generation of a firm with quadratic cost function in a Cournot game against a firm with linear cost function 
generally follows the same basic structure as 𝐾𝐸
𝑟𝑒𝑠 ∗. 
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The availability of renewables impacts the prices in each state. A renewable source with higher 
availability increases market price in the periods without renewable injection6 as it lowers investment in 
conventional technology as explained above. However, the decreased market price in periods with 
renewable injection (equation (37)) is great enough to compensate the market increase in periods 
without renewable injection to the extent that that the average market price7 decreases with higher 
availability of renewables.  
5.2 Renewable Support Schemes 
In the following, we extend the model to analyze investment subsidies, feed-in-premium, and feed-in-
tariff schemes. In all cases, we assume that the support scheme is financed from the general 
government budget.  
5.2.1 Investment Subsidies 
Proposition 6: 
In the case of an investment subsidy scheme and imperfect competition, equilibrium investment 
capacities are given by: 
KG
cnv ∗ =
1
2b
(𝑎 − cmrg −
ccnv
(1 − q)T
) 
KG
res ∗ =
cmrg +
i
qT
cres/qT
 
KE
res ∗ =
𝑎 + cmrg
2 +
i
qT
cres
qT + b
 
Proof: Given that the operation stage of this investment subsidy scheme is the same as for the no 
support case, the resulting total investment objectives are as follows: 
max
KE
res
 qT (
𝑎 + c
2
KE
res −
b
2
KE
res 2) −  
1
2
cresKE
res  2 + iKE
res (42) 
max
KG
cnv,KG
res
 qT ((
𝑎 + c
2
−
bKE
res
2
− cmrg) (
𝑎 − cmrg
b
−
KE
res
2
) + cmrgKG
res)
+  (1 − q)T((𝑎 − cmrg)KG
cnv − bKG
cnv 2) − ccnvKG
cnv  −
1
2
cresKG
res  2 + iKG
res 
(43) 
Consequently, the incentives for investment in conventional capacities are unaltered whereas the first 
order conditions with respect to 𝐾𝐸
𝑟𝑒𝑠 and 𝐾𝐺
𝑟𝑒𝑠 directly lead to the results stated in Proposition 6. ▄ 
                                                          
6 PU∗ =  𝑎+c
mrg
2
+
ccnv
2(1−q)T
 
7 Pavg =
𝑎+cmrg
2
+
ccnv
2T
−
bq
2
𝑎+cmrg
2
cres
qT
+b
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As with the perfectly competitive setting, the resulting equilibrium investment behavior is 
straightforward: the renewable investments are adjusted by the (normalized) subsidy rates (𝑖/𝑞𝑇) as it 
provides additional marginal revenue for investments in renewable technology for both firms. This extra 
marginal revenue leads to a higher installed renewable capacity whereas the conventional investment is 
not impacted since their investment incentives stem from the periods without renewable production.  
5.2.2 Feed-in Premium 
Proposition 7:  
In the case of a feed-in premium support scheme and imperfect competition, equilibrium investment 
capacities are given by: 
KG
cnv ∗ =
1
2b
(𝑎 − cmrg −
ccnv
(1 − q)T
) 
KG
res ∗ =
cmrg + p
cres/qT
 
KE
res ∗ =
𝑎 + cmrg
2 + p
cres
qT + b
 
Proof: 𝜋𝐺
𝑈 is not impacted by the premium while the optimization problem of G in state A is altered to: 
πG
A = max
QG
cnv,A
PA(QG
cnv,A + KG
res) − cmrgQG
cnv,A + pKG
res (44) 
leading to:  
QG
cnv,A∗ =
𝑎 − cmrg
2b
− KG
res −
KE
res
2
 (45) 
PA ∗ =
𝑎 + 𝑐
2
−
bKE
res
2
 (46) 
And given 𝜋𝐸
𝐴 = 𝑃𝐴∗𝐾𝐸
𝑟𝑒𝑠, we have: 
πE
A = (
𝑎 + 𝑐
2
−
bKE
res
2
+ p) KE
res (47) 
As a result, the investment stage optimizations are: 
max
KE
res
 qT ((
𝑎 + c
2
+ p) KE
res −
b
2
KE
res 2)  −  
1
2
cresKE
res  2 (48) 
max
KG
cnv,KG
res
 qT ((
𝑎 + c
2
−
bKE
res
2
− cmrg) (
𝑎 − cmrg
b
−
KE
res
2
) + cmrgKG
res + pKG
res)  
+ (1 − q)T((𝑎 − cmrg)KG
cnv − bKG
cnv 2) − ccnvKG
cnv  −
1
2
cresKG
res  2 
(49) 
The first order conditions with respect to 𝐾𝐸
𝑟𝑒𝑠, 𝐾𝐺
𝑟𝑒𝑠, and 𝐾𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣 directly lead to the results stated in 
Proposition 7. ▄ 
The results are similar to the investment subsidy. The premium provides additional revenue in the 
spot market stage, which is then considered in the investment stage.  
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5.2.3 Feed-in Tariff 
Proposition 8:  
In the case of a feed-in tariff support scheme and imperfect competition, equilibrium investment 
capacities are given by: 
KG
cnv ∗ =
1
2b
(𝑎 − cmrg −
ccnv
(1 − q)T
) 
KG
res ∗ =
f
2b
(
b
Cres/q T
+ 2) −
1
2b
(𝑎 − cmrg)
Cres/q T
b
−
1
2
 
KE
res ∗ =
f
cres
qT
 
Proof: 𝜋𝐺
𝑈 is again not impacted by the renewable support scheme while the optimization problem of G 
in state A is altered to: 
πG
A = max
QG
cnv,A
PAQG
cnv,A − cmrgQG
cnv,A + fKG
res (50) 
Solving the first order conditions yields:  
 
QG
cnv,A∗ =
𝑎 − cmrg
2b
−
KG
res + KE
res
2
 (51) 
PA∗ =
𝑎 + c
2
−
b(KE
res + KG
res)
2
 (52) 
Given that, πG
A = fKG
res, the adjusted investment stage optimizations are: 
 
max
KE
res
 qT(fKE
res)  − 
1
2
cresKE
res  2 (53) 
max
KG
cnv,KG
res
 qT ((
𝑎 + 𝑐
2
−
b(KE
res + KG
res)
2
− 𝑐𝑚𝑟𝑔) (
𝑎 − cmrg
2b
−
KG
res
2
−
KE
res
2
) + fKG
res)  
+ (1 − q)T((𝑎 − cmrg)KG
cnv − bKG
cnv 2) − ccnvKG
cnv  −
1
2
cresKG
res  2 
(54) 
The first order conditions with respect to 𝐾𝐸
𝑟𝑒𝑠, 𝐾𝐺
𝑟𝑒𝑠, and 𝐾𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣 directly lead to the results stated in 
Proposition 8. ▄ 
The investment of the exclusively renewable firm is completely driven by the feed-in tariff and do 
not react to market dynamics. For the generalist firm the optimal choice of 𝐾𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣, as in all previous cases, 
is not impacted by the feed-in tariff. However, its choice for 𝐾𝐺
𝑟𝑒𝑠 and 𝑄𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣,𝐴 is more complicated: unlike 
the previous settings, the choice of 𝐾𝐺
𝑟𝑒𝑠 does affect market prices in state A and in turn the generalist 
has to account for the different interactions induced by the feed-in tariff. 
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As shown in equations (50), renewable and conventional generation are paid with different rates (𝑓 
and 𝑃𝐴 respectively). Consequently, they have different effects on G’s marginal profit in the first place. 
𝑃𝐴 depends on the choice of 𝐾𝐺
𝑟𝑒𝑠 inducing a feedback effect on the choice of 𝑄𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣,𝐴; i.e. firm G treats 
its own and opponent’s renewable production identically when deciding on the optimal conventional 
output (equations (51)). Generalizing the formulation of the first part of equation (54) representing state 
A helps to visualize the different effects: 
qT(PA(KG
res)QG
cnv,A(KG
res) − cmrgQG
cnv,A(KG
res) + fKG
res)  
(55) 
The first part is the income from selling the conventional generation on the spot market, with both 
the market price and the generation quantity being dependent on the choice of renewable capacity 
(equations (51) and (52)). The second part is the variable cost block for conventional generation and the 
last part the income from the feed-in tariff. The first order condition of equation (55) with respect to 
𝐾𝐺
𝑟𝑒𝑠leads to: 
qT (
𝜕PA
𝜕KG
res QG
cnv,A + PA
𝜕QG
cnv,A
𝜕KG
res − c
mrg
𝜕QG
cnv,A
𝜕KG
res + f)  
(56) 
Given that 
∂PA
∂KG
res = −
b
2
 and 
𝜕𝑄𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣,𝐴
𝜕𝐾𝐺
𝑟𝑒𝑠 = −
1
2
 , we can simplify this formulation to: 
qT (−
b
2
QG
cnv,A∗ −
1
2
PA∗ +
1
2
cmrg + f)  
(57) 
Thus, an increase in renewable capacity will reduce the total income from conventional generation 
by a factor of −
𝑏
2
. The replacement of conventional with renewable generation at a ratio of 1:2 will lead 
to a corresponding saving from reduced variable generation costs and income loss from the replaced 
conventional generation and an increased income due to the feed-in tariff. Combining this with the 
investment cost term leads to the optimal renewable capacity as stated in Proposition 8. 
Furthermore, higher investment of the exclusively renewable firm causes the generalist firm to also 
invest more into renewables. This might seem counter intuitive at first glance since more invested 
capacity in the market should decrease the room for more investments. However, more renewable 
investment decreases the market price (equation (52)). Given that the marginal revenue of the 
renewable investment for the generalist is negatively related to the market price, a lower market price 
translates into higher renewable investments for the generalist since the substituted conventional 
production of the generalist faces less market losses. In other words, decreasing the market price for the 
conventional technology increases the relative favorability of the feed-in rate awarded to the renewable 
productions. 
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5.3 Comparative Conclusion 
Table 2 presents an overview of the equilibrium capacity investments under different policies in 
imperfectly competitive markets. As with the perfectly competitive setting, support schemes do not 
change the equilibrium investments in conventional technologies as they do not impact marginal 
revenues gained in the state that renewables are unavailable, i.e. sate U.  
With respect to renewable investments, the different cases show a divergence between the two 
players. The difference in renewable investments of the generalist and the exclusively renewable firm is 
mainly driven by the fact that firms have different investment motives. While the exclusively renewable 
firm maximizes the profit gained from only one source, the generalist aims to maximize its aggregate 
profit rather than the profit of each one of the technologies separately. In market-based approaches, 
the exclusively renewable firm exercises market power and withholds capacity investment to increase 
price in the operation stage while the generalist considers technology substitutions when allocating its 
aggregate production goal to its technologies. In other words, renewable investments of exclusively 
renewable firm are market driven while renewable investments of the generalist are mainly internal 
decision (plus possible support rates). On the other hand, under feed-in tariff policy, the exclusively 
renewable firm simply considers the feed-in rate and has no incentive to exercise market power while 
the generalist also has to consider the feedback loop between its renewable investment and the market 
price in state A. In other words, under feed-in tariff, the exclusively renewable firm is isolated from the 
market while that of the generalist is partially market driven.  
In line with findings of T. Oliveira (2015), comparing (36) and (45) with (51) shows that conventional 
production of generalist firm in state A of the market-based schemes is more sensitive to its own 
renewable capacity additions (a ratio of 1:1 for market-based policies vs. a ratio of 2:1 for the feed-in 
rate policy). We may additionally show that if the regulator targets similar total aggregate renewable 
productions,8 conventional generation in the market-based schemes is less than that of the feed-in tariff 
scheme.9 In other words, market-based schemes are more successful in reducing CO2 emissions in 
imperfectly competitive markets.  
Table 2 Equilibrium investments under imperfect competition 
 No support Investment subsidies Feed-in premium Feed-in tariff 
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1
2b
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) 
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res ∗ 
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cres/qT
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i
qT
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cmrg + p
cres/qT
 
f
2b (
b
Cres/q T + 2) −
1
2b (𝑎 − c
mrg)
Cres/q T
b −
1
2
 
KE
res ∗ 
𝑎 + cmrg
2
cres/(qT) + b
 
𝑎 + cmrg
2 +
i
qT
cres/(qT) + b
 
𝑎 + cmrg
2 + p
cres/(qT) + b
 
f
Cres/qT
 
                                                          
8 That is KE
res,FIP + KG
res,FIP = KG
res,FIT + KE
res,FIT which is in contrast to the comparisons made in T. Oliveira (2015) 
that are carried out for assuming KE
res,FIP = KE
res,FIT and KE
res,FIP = KE
res,FIT. 
9 Proof: We would like to show that QG
cnv,A ∗,FIP < QG
cnv,A∗,FIT. Given that we know 
KG
res,FIP
2
> 0 and KE
res,FIP +
KG
res,FIP = KG
res,FIT + KE
res,FIT, we have 
𝑎−cmrg
2b
−
1
2
(KE
res,FIP + KG
res,FIP) −
KG
res,FIP
2
<
𝑎−cmrg
2b
−
1
2
(KG
res,FIT + KE
res,FIT) 
which according to (36) and (51) means: QG
cnv,A ∗,FIP < QG
cnv,A∗,FIT. 
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Comparing (37) and (46) with (52) shows that investment behavior of the exclusively renewable 
firm has a crucial effect on market prices in all settings whereas the generalist’s renewable investments 
only impact prices in a feed-in tariff setting. This finding is in line with Acemoglu et al. (2017) which 
shows, that in a market-based approach, if all firms own both conventional and renewable capacity, 
market price becomes independent of total renewable investments. In contrast, Dressler (2016) predicts 
that, under FIP, for sufficiently high available renewable capacity and a sufficiently low feed-in rate, 
market price could become independent of renewable capacity. This independence is mainly driven by 
the assumption that renewable capacity is exogenously set. On the other hand, under feed-in tariffs, 
increasing renewable production of any one of the firms reduces the obtained market price equally as a 
feed-in tariff provides less room for technology coordination of the generalist firm. This echoes the 
finding in  T. Oliveira (2015) that states “under FIT, the addition of renewable capacity by any type of 
firm reduces the markup on thermal energy”.  
Comparing market prices of different support policies for similar total aggregate renewable 
productions shows that market-based schemes (e.g. FIP) lead to a higher market price compared to a 
feed-in tariff approach.10 This follows directly from the fact that under market-based policies, the 
generalist has more incentives to withhold conventional production. Our result is in contrast to the 
findings in Dressler (2016) stating that for relatively low renewable targets, market price under FIP and 
FIT are identical. This is mainly driven by the author’s assumption that only an exclusively renewable 
firm can invest in renewables, which will result in a lower estimation of market price under FIP than in 
our setting.  Comparison of quantities and prices for different support policies shows that even though 
market-based policies result in a desirable lower CO2 emission, it comes at a cost for the consumer that 
is higher market price. 
 
6. Comparison of perfect and imperfect competition 
In this section, we analyze and compare the insights from the two pervious sections to identify the 
impact of strategic behavior on renewable support and market performance. We first focus on analytical 
aspects and then turn to a numerical illustration to highlight the relevance of the derived insights. 
6.1 Analytical comparison 
Exercise of market power raises the issue of underinvestment in the conventional technology. 𝐾𝐺
𝑐𝑛𝑣 ∗ in 
Section 5 is only half the size of the investments in the competitive setting in Section 4. This is the 
normal quantity effect when comparing output of a monopoly and competitive setting with constant 
cost and linear demand structures. Given that the refinancing of conventional investments only occurs 
via state U this is a direct effect of the chosen model structure. 
                                                          
10 Acemoglu et al. (2017) and T. Oliveira (2015) do not intend to compare market and non-market based support 
policies at similar total renewable productions. Being focused on a market-based approach, Acemoglu et al. (2017) 
does not analyze a feed-in tariff policy. On the other hand, under FIT, T. Oliveira (2015) ends up with only corner 
solutions for renewable investments, which makes comparison with FIP difficult. 
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With respect to renewable investments, firms invest identically in the perfect competitive case, but 
support schemes have different effects on the investors if they exercise market power. As a result, if 
markets are imperfectly competitive, heterogeneity of investors should be considered while estimating 
the effects of support schemes or the budget required.  
The exercise of market power by the generalist firm, G, incentivizes the exclusively renewable firm, 
E, to invest more while E’s exercise of market power decreases its own renewable investments. In state 
A of market-based schemes, the prices of imperfectly competitive cases are going to be higher than that 
of the perfectly competitive markets (𝑐𝑚𝑟𝑔). This higher market price incentivizes firm E to invest more 
in renewables compared to perfectly competitive markets. In fact, if E does not exercise market power 
while G continues to exercise market power, renewable investments of E in a market without support 
equals to: 11 
KE
res ∗ =
𝑎 + cmrg
2
cres/(qT) + b/2 
 (58) 
However, if also firm E exercises market power, it withholds capacity investments to increase the market 
price even further (𝐾𝐸
𝑟𝑒𝑠 ∗ in (58) > 𝐾𝐸
𝑟𝑒𝑠 ∗in Proposition 5). As a result, if firms exercise market power, 
the effect on total renewable generation is theoretically ambiguous. If market price mark-up effect 
outweighs the capacity withholding incentives of E, E invests more in renewables in an imperfectly 
competitive market compared to a perfectly competitive market.12 
A higher demand (in form of higher 𝑎) has different effects across the cases. In perfectly 
competitive markets, higher demand results in more investments only in conventional technologies. 
Renewables are not affected since the market price of state A is only set by the marginal cost of the 
conventional producer. On the other hand, in imperfectly competitive markets with market-based 
schemes, higher 𝑎 motivates not only more investments in conventional technology, but also more 
investments in renewable technologies from the exclusively renewable firm since the market price in 
state A is increased by the higher demand. On the other hand, in a feed-in tariff scheme, higher demand 
has just the opposite effect: higher 𝑎 leads to less renewable investments because higher demand 
translates to higher market price, which makes conventional production relatively more interesting to 
firm G.  
Naturally, strategic behavior influences also the average market price. In a perfectly competitive 
market, under different market designs, average market price is fixed to 𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑔 = 𝑐𝑚𝑟𝑔 +
𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑣
𝑇
 which is 
sufficient for the conventional technology to refinance investment and operation costs. In an 
imperfectly competitive market, the average market price under market-based support schemes is 
𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑔 =  
𝑎+𝑐𝑚𝑟𝑔
2
+
𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑣
2𝑇
−
𝑏𝑞
2
𝐾𝐸
𝑟𝑒𝑠 ∗. As a result, more investment in renewables by the exclusively 
renewable firm decreases the market price while investments of the conventional technology do not 
alter the average market price.  
                                                          
11 This is given by solving 𝜋𝐸𝐴 = 𝑃𝐴𝐾𝐸𝑟𝑒𝑠 in theorem 5 considering 
𝑑𝑃𝐴
𝑑𝐾𝐸
𝑟𝑒𝑠 = 0. 
12 Which will be the case if 𝑏 <
𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠
2𝑞𝑇
(
𝑎
𝑐𝑚𝑟𝑔
− 1). 
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6.2 Numerical comparison 
To showcase the impact of the different market and support settings, we now turn to a simple 
numerical illustration based on a general set of parameters: 𝑎 = 100, 𝑏 = 1, 𝑐𝑚𝑟𝑔 = 30, 𝑞 = 0.2, 𝑇 = 30, 
𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠 = 20, and 𝐶𝑐𝑛𝑣 = 100. We consider the case that the regulator targets a total renewable capacity 
and sets the premium and feed-in tariff accordingly. 13  
Figure 2 highlights the resulting conventional and renewable quantities at various regulatory 
renewable targets in perfectly and imperfectly competitive markets. As discussed in the conceptual 
comparison above, the generalist withholds production in either states of imperfectly competitive 
markets. Moreover, renewable support do not impact conventional generations in state U (and thereby 
the total installed conventional capacity). However, with an increase in renewable capacities in the 
system, the output of conventional power plants in state A is steadily decreasing (Figure 2, left panel). 
Unlike perfectly competitive markets, in imperfectly competitive markets the type of support policy 
affects the conventional production of the firm in state A: Under a FIT, generalist’s conventional output 
is higher than under a FIP regime, as the renewable output is also benefiting from higher market prices 
in a FIP regime increasing incentives to withhold output. With respect to renewable investments (Figure 
2, right panel) firm G is always investing less than firm E in the imperfect market setting whereas both 
firms invest equally under perfect competitive conditions. The support schemes have divergent effects 
on the incentives for G and E; however, the scale is rather minor in the example. 
Combining conventional and renewable quantities for firm G under imperfect competition shows 
that under a FIT regime the overall output in state A remains rather constant (firm G has a slight 
increase from 31.6 to 33.3 units in the considered range). However, under a FIP regime the combined 
output of firm G is reducing (from 27.5 to 22.4 units). As the overall market quantity is increasing, this 
translates into a reduction of market share for firm G under a FIP regime for higher renewable targets. 
 
 
Figure 2: Quantity results of numerical example 
 
                                                          
13 We skip presenting the investment subsidy scheme since it is equivalent to a feed-in premium case if tailored 
properly. 
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Figure 3: Price results of numerical example 
 
The quantity results translate also into respective market price effects (Figure 3, left panel). 
Whereas under perfect competition the market price in state A is fixed and defined by the conventional 
generation costs, under imperfect competition we observe a price mark-up that is generally decreasing 
with higher renewable targets. This decrease is more pronounced under a FIT regime than under a FIP 
reflecting the overall faster quantity increase under a FIT regime.  
With respect to the needed support rates to obtain the desired renewable target (Figure 3, right 
panel), the perfect competition results highlight the general difference between a FIT and a FIP: the 
market prices. The spread between both rates is always equal to the market price reflecting the fact that 
under a FIT renewable generation does not obtain income on the wholesale market. The support rates 
are generally increasing with the renewable target as renewable investments have an increasing cost 
function. Under imperfect competition the needed support rate in a FIP regime is slightly less than 
under perfect competition reflecting the fact that market prices (and thereby income for renewable 
generation) is higher due to the price mark-up. However, the difference is less than the mark-up and 
gradually decreasing with the increasing renewable target. For the FIT regime the reverse effect is 
observable. The support rate needs to be higher under imperfect competition to at least partially 
compensate for the foregone higher market prices for renewable output.  
The right panel of Figure 3 highlights the importance for the regulator to know the competitiveness 
level of the market. The same support rates will lead to different renewable investments depending on 
the company behavior and subsequent the desired renewable target may not be reached. Figure 4 
highlights this effect for a setting in which the regulator assumes perfect competition whereas the 
market outcome is defined by strategic company behavior. In case of a FIP regime the resulting 
renewable investment is larger than anticipated as the perfectly competitive rate assumes a lower 
market price than what actually will emerge. The reverse is true for the FIT regime. The relative 
difference is higher for smaller renewable targets as for higher targets both the imperfect FIP and FIT 
support rate levels converge to the perfect competitive ones (see Figure 3, right panel). 
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Figure 4: Deviation of RES investment from target level due to misidentification of competitiveness 
The scale of this error can be compared to another potential forecast error with high relevance for 
renewable support schemes: renewable cost estimates.14 Especially for the lower renewable targets, the 
resulting error stemming from a wrong perception of market competitiveness is equivalent to a cost 
estimation error of 20 to 30%. Albeit a stylized example, this highlights the importance to not only 
account for technical aspects when designing renewable support schemes but also investigate the 
market dynamics and structures to derive a robust support regime. 
 
7. Limitations 
Given the highly stylized structure of our model the results and insights are naturally subject to 
limitations. Following we will shortly highlight the main structural aspects neglected by the model and 
their impact on our findings. 
One central aspect of our analysis is the differentiation between only two states and two 
technologies. In reality, a set of different conventional and renewable technologies is available for 
investment purposes and market conditions are shaped by more than just an on/off availability of 
renewables. However, breaking the findings down into their main conclusions many of those additional 
dynamics do not necessarily alter the conclusions.  
Renewable investments in market-based systems are defined by the income they can generate 
during periods they are available. Under perfectly competitive conditions those periods will have price 
levels equal to the fuel costs of the marginal conventional power plant. Whereas in our model this was 
predefined by the restriction to only one conventional technology, in reality this will likely be a set of 
different plants at different periods. But renewable investments will still be shaped by the average 
                                                          
14 For example, most feed-in tariff regimes assume a gradual decreasing tariff rate due to assumed cost 
improvements for renewable technologies. 
Page | 28  
market price they can obtain during their operation periods. In a strategic setting this price is further 
influenced by the market power mark-ups. Thus, investment incentives for firm E remain largely similar 
to the structures defined by our model. 
For the generalist firm G, the interactions between conventional and renewable investments 
become important. The finding that the conventional investment is not impacted by renewable support 
is given by the fact that, by definition, their capacity limit is only binding in state U. In reality the 
interplay of demand dynamics, renewable injection and different plant technologies will lead to 
situations where plants are at their capacity limit but not the price setting unit; i.e. they are 
inframarginal in some of the periods. Introducing support policy for renewables will likely impact market 
prices in those periods and in turn impact investment decisions of those units that are inframarginal. 
This is represented by the availability element in the conventional capacity results (i.e. (1 − 𝑞)𝑇). 
However, the basic investment logic still follows the structure presented by the model: conventional 
generators only earn profit in those periods their capacity limit is binding. If the duration and/or price 
level in those periods is impacted by renewables, there will be a feedback effect (i.e. investments in 
conventional technologies will scale back as renewable investments scale up). How exactly this feedback 
effect plays out is subject for further research as this also depends on the representation of renewable 
technologies.  
In practice, multiple renewable technologies coexist with potentially different availability patterns, 
which might affect decisions in imperfectly competitive markets. Marginal decision-making concept 
suggests that if availability pattern of two technologies have no overlap, their investment decisions will 
be made independently from each other since they have no effects on each other’s marginal profit. Also, 
in the case of overlapping availabilities under FIT, renewable investments of the exclusively renewable 
firm are independently decided since their marginal profit depends only on their corresponding feed-in 
rates. Therefore, their renewable investments will be structurally similar to our results. The generalist 
firm, on the other hand, would invest more in renewables if overlap of availability results in lower 
market price and consequently mark-ups on conventional technology. On the other hand, under other 
policies (namely FIP, investment subsidies and no subsidies), marginal profit of each technology would 
depend on other technologies (via effects on market price). Therefore, the renewable investment of 
overlapping technologies would impact each other. 
The same arguments on inframarginal suppliers and impact of availabilities also applies to demand 
related aspects. A more detailed representation of the demand dynamics over periods (i.e. peak and off-
peak demand) as well as demand elasticities will interact with the availability pattern of renewable 
technologies and thereby impact the potential for marginal profits for conventional technologies. The 
same basic incentive structures as in our model will prevail but depending on the correlation between 
availability and demand level (e.g. solar generation and demand are at least partially correlated) there 
can be structures that favor or disfavor specific technology combinations. 
Another important restriction of our model is its deterministic nature. As long-term renewable 
production involves some degrees of uncertainty and investors can have different levels of risk-aversion, 
including both aspects could alter incentive structures. This is also important in regard to the risk 
hedging provided by the support mechanism; e.g. a FIT regime will shield investors from market related 
uncertainties and could have positive feedback effects on investment costs due to lower capital 
expenses. 
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Our model is designed as a greenfield setting whereas real world electricity markets represent a 
brownfield setting with existing technologies in place. In the long run the investment incentives should 
follow the structure presented by our model as exiting plants will eventually by phased out and their 
sunk cost nature should not impact new investment decisions. However, given their potential impact on 
price structures across periods they may alter the transition pathway until a stable investment 
equilibrium is reached.  
One final important simplification of our model is the assumption that the support schemes are 
financed by the state budget and there is no feedback effect from refinancing. However, in many real-
world electricity markets, support schemes are at least partially self-financed by a levy on electricity bills 
of end-consumers or a lump-sum tax. As a result, more support for renewables increases the total costs 
of the consumers and consequently influence market demand and market prices. This feedback effect is 
also highly relevant for support systems based on green quotas and tradeable permits.  
 
8. Conclusion 
In this paper we investigate investment and dispatch decisions of conventional and renewable 
technologies in electricity markets. Accounting for two types of firms – an exclusively renewable 
investor and a mixed renewable-conventional investor – we derive their equilibrium behavior under 
perfect and Cournot competition for different renewable support schemes; namely feed-in tariff, feed-in 
premium, and investment subsidies for renewables. 
Using a two-stage model setting we can show that heterogeneous firms behave similarly in 
perfectly competitive markets but differently in the presence of market power. The feedback effect 
from their own investment decisions and the consideration of their competitor’s behavior leads to 
divergent incentive structures. While an exclusively renewable firm focuses on market price, a generalist 
firm considers also the substitution possibility between its technologies. As a result, heterogeneity of 
investors as well as the competitive level of the market should be considered while estimating the 
effects of support schemes or the budget required. These interactions may increase in importance if 
beside environmental objectives, renewable support is also expected to enhance competition levels. 
Albeit highly stylized in its structure, the model highlights the basic incentive structures for 
investments into conventional and renewable technologies. The former being completely dependent on 
those states of the world in which they reach their own capacity limits. Only in those periods they will be 
able to obtain revenue streams to cover their investment costs. Renewables on the other hand are 
heavily impacted by the price levels defined by marginal cost structures from conventional units and/or 
additional income provided by support schemes. Coupled those two effects reflect the current challenge 
many electricity markets face: increased renewable generation is pushing conventional units to the 
fringe and reducing their own market income due to the merit-order effect. This in turn requires higher 
cross-financing via support schemes to maintain sufficient income streams. In the long run, such a 
market setting would lead to a price divergence between periods with high renewable injection with low 
prices (being capped at marginal generation costs of the remaining conventional generators) and 
periods when conventional plants reach their capacity limits and prices spike to refinance their 
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investments. This price spread between available and unavailable states (replacing the former peak and 
off-peak spread) will furthermore set potential incentives for storage technologies. 
Consequently, the model presented here can be seen as a first step to conceptualize the dynamics 
in today’s electricity markets. Naturally, there is the need for further adjustments to identify challenges 
and opportunities for the different technologies and derive robust policy and market design concepts. 
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